CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECT OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS ON TERRORISM

Terrorism is one of the main security issues that India currently faces. It is not a new phenomenon to India by any stretch of the imagination. The task of eliminating or reducing terrorism and its effects is something that many democracies around the world are attempting to solve, with varying degrees of success. In the case of India, troubled relations with Pakistan on a variety of issues has abetted the rise of militant groups and fostered terrorist action in an attempt voice defiance and gain the upper hand on geo-political issues without the use of outright military intervention (and subsequent international scorn). This paper aims to show how the deprecating nature of Indian/Pakistani relations have fueled the rise of terrorism in India by first looking at the underlying tensions in the relationship between the two countries, followed by the actions taken on both sides, the US’s role in the matter, and lastly a conclusion based on my analysis, with a recommended course of action. To do this, the paper will look at sources from Indian and international media, independent think tanks, and research from other scholars on the topic.

In order to look at the complex issue of terrorism, one must look at the underlying issues of those perpetrating the violent acts, and what motivates/drives such extreme tactics. With India and Pakistan there are a great deal of conflicting interests, which have led to armed aggression. The most predominant of which is the Kashmir region in the Northwest of India (Burke, 2010, p.1). The Kashmir region is key to both nations because it sits at the commencement of the Indus river basin, which serves as the starting point for rivers that flow into both India and Pakistan. Concordantly, whoever controls the area has the ability to direct water flows, which greatly affects agricultural output, and general livability in the area (Amies, 2010, p.2). Other concerns for India include Islamabad’s general instability, especially because of its nuclear capabilities, and the potential for that power to fall into the wrong hands with devastating consequences. Other contentions include some religious differences, which especially in recent have played a larger role (the effects of the radicalization of Muslim populations).

 The territorial dispute has been a major fissure in India/Pakistan (and Chinese) relations and has become a perpetual struggle between the governments. In the last ten years however, the conflict has taken a different turn and increasingly, proxy militant groups sponsored by both parties (for the purpose of this argument, China will be omitted from the analysis) have begun playing a larger role, complicating the issue (Chalk, 2011, p.1). Where the conflict was previously localized, concerning those people and groups immediately impacted, more and more outside parties and individuals are entering, funded by governments and fueled by extreme ideology and heavily influenced (in the case of Pakistani backed groups) by religion (Hasan, 2010, p.1). This complicates the dynamic because stirring up militant groups and sending them off to wage war has great potential for unintended consequences. The government’s that sponsor such groups do not have complete control over their actions, leaving newly empowered players to their own, potentially grievous, devices.

Pakistan has the most prominent use of state sponsored terrorism. When faced with India’s advanced military, larger economy, and relatively stable governance, Pakistan has had to result to unorthodox tactics in order to shift the balance of power back in their favor. The ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) is Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency (and also highly independent from the government) that supports many of these groups. They do so not only in funding but also in training, indoctrinating, and arming (Chalk, 2001, p.1). The numbers of militants and how much Pakistan spends on these endeavors varies, as the ISI is a relatively secretive agency, and transparency is not a chief concern.

Some of these groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (based out of Pakistan, funded by the state and known to be behind the Mumbai attacks of 2008) are openly recognized terrorist organizations, which not only India, but also the international community condemns (Bajoria, 2010, p.1). In many cases Pakistan will use madrasas or religious schools to teach relatively uneducated men a biased secular education and breeds terrorist sentiment. From there many are recruited into groups such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Harkatul Mujahideen (to name a few of the more predominant groups) each with their own specific vocations, but all generally aimed against India (Chalk, 2010, p.1). With a lack of legitimate opportunities for these marginalized people in more traditional professions such as farming, herding, or production, they are left with few options. As a result, these madrasa’s have an easy task of recruiting; by calling on men’s religious duty (leading towards jihad), and receiving funding and logistics from the state, these groups can successfully create a guerilla force (Chalk, 2010, p.1). They rely on hit and run, sabotage and other techniques to beleaguer the Indian forces. This is abetted by a growing trend of radical Islamic fundamentalism, which opposes Western influence that many parallel with India, a democracy and a strong US ally. Combined with the Pakistani regular army, they have managed to hold on to their position in the region.

India has responded to the situation in a slightly different manner. It relies solely regular military forces to patrol physical the borer outposts. However this is not to say that India has used purely traditional military means to influence the conflict. India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW, India’s counterpart to Pakistan’s ISI) was initially created to gather intelligence on Kashmir and Pakistan in general. As it grew, its role in the conflict has proliferated. It has been accused of sponsoring sabotage in areas of Pakistan. (Pike, 2002, p.1) RAW has also been accused of supporting the Seraiki separatist movement within Pakistan, dissident groups of Sindh, Punjab and the Northwest Frontier; all in attempts to destabilize Pakistan. Also, India has been accused of supporting Baloch rebels, (based out of Balochistan, a large province in Pakistan) that attempted to secede from Pakistan. (Pike, 2002, p.1).

Religious tension is another catalyst for terrorism between the two countries. It is well documented that the radicalization of Islam has had dramatic effects in this conflict. It is a great underlying factor in the region, which has had many consequences. However, a growing movement that is not as well documented is the Hindu nationalization, which stands to be a serious problem (Narula, 2003, p.42). When Indian Hindu’s hear about attacks on fellow Hindu’s by Muslims, particularly in Pakistan, it breeds an anti-Muslim sentiment which in some cases can be manifested as an anti-Pakistani attitude, especially when looking at the Kashmir region. This could result in Indian non-state actors becoming involved, and if their involvement becomes violent, Pakistan will most likely condemn it as state sponsored violence and will react in turn, continuing the spiral of conflict (Narula, 2003, p.42).

Another large fissure between India and Pakistan has been India’s role in the Afghanistan war. Pakistan sees India’s large roll in the reconstruction of Afghanistan as an attempt to encircle Pakistan, and further gain strategic advantage against Pakistan by aligning itself with the Afghanis (Bajoria, 2009, p.1).  Pakistan traditionally enjoys a close relationship with Afghanistan and has been meddling in Afghanistan since the US withdrew its forces/influence in 1989 after the fall of the USSR, and has fancied Afghanistan as its ‘colony’, enjoying porous borders and a similar heritage, tying the countries. (Chellaney, 2002, p.10) 

However, the attacks of September 11^th, and the US engagement of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban has altered that dynamic. Pakistan has ventured that India is using its roll in Afghanistan as a cover for Indian intelligence to infiltrate Pakistan. India is one of the largest regional donors to the reconstruction, committing $1.2 billion in aid (Bajoria, 2009, p.1). In the eyes of the Indian government, stabilizing Afghanistan would be beneficial in solidifying a trading partner, as well as trading routes through the country. However, the Pakistan state sees this as another regional threat and has clearly expressed their discontent (Bajoria, 2009, p.1).   

Another factor that has to be taken into account is the United States influence in the region. It is common knowledge that, the United States substantially supported anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan in the 80’s with weapons, supplies and funds to fight a guerilla style war against the USSR. However, this has had unintended consequences. Some of these rebels who were backed by the US have been recruited (via the ISI) by the Pakistan state. These rebels have since found themselves invigorated by the Pakistani state, and directed to the Kashmir border, (Chellany, 2002, p.5) fighting an insurgency under the auspices of militants, but ultimately guided by Pakistan.

Both countries enjoy and reap benefits from US interests in the region. After the attacks of 9/11, and the announcement of the war on terror, India jumped to help the US. India opened its military bases, airfields and regional intelligence to US forces as they geared up and entered into the Afghanistan conflict. (Chellany, 2002, p.8) However the US then turned to Pakistan and allied themselves closely, giving the Pakistani government billions in funds and logistical support to help fight the insurgency in Afghanistan, much to the chagrin of India, (Times of India, 2010) who fear the funds will instead be appropriated to the Kashmir border. This also disheartens India to see the US collaborating with Pakistan, which is widely recognized to be a state sponsor of terrorism.

The accusations from the Pakistani’s regarding India’s support of dissidents have come into some question regarding their legitimacy. For instance the Baloch insurgency has been categorically denied by India (as with many of the other incidents) but little evidence has been found to support the claim made by the Pakistani state for Indian support of Baloch rebels. For instance, the Indian Express quoted the Center of International Policy (a Washington based think tank), which published findings that India had not aided the rebels (Indian Express, 2009). While this seems to be a more clear-cut case, both sides have contradicting figures and their own supporting evidence, although the authenticity of their claims is debatable at times.

Conclusion

In looking at the sources gathered and analyzing the information, one can begin to understand the forces at play in this complicated issue. Through the process of this analysis I have been able to come to several possible courses of action, which might be able to take to help alleviate the problems of terrorism and stabilize the Kashmir conflict.

There are several steps, which India can take to help stem the terrorist violence and ease tensions between Pakistan and India.  First and foremost, the Indian state must retain and enhance its legitimacy, especially in dealing with the Kashmir conflict. India is embroiled an insurgency, and so it must win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people within the region in order to truly see forward progress and a reduction of violent extremist actions. India could attempt to increase security around the state and interests as a means to solve the problem, but with an incredibly large population, and geographic size it would cost the state a great deal, and arguably be a misuse of resources. Having said this, security should still play a vital role, but it will not ultimately solve the dilemma. One could argue that it might be a better fit to fight the underlying problems of terrorist attracts (and the related insurgency) at their cause.

 India has already taken some steps to increasing their legitimacy in holding the 2008 elections in Kashmir (which were widely considered fair and free) to allow the people to govern themselves. Although the Pakistani government discredited the elections, (one could argue because the results were not favorable to Pakistan) this stands a perfect example of how India can reign in the people through legitimate means.

In India’s skirmishes with Pakistani militants and its army, it must be certain when using military force that they minimize civilian casualties, both in terms of body counts, but also in terms of destruction. If citizens see their lands ravaged and family members maimed by Indian bombs and bullets, it draws more sympathy to the Pakistani militants, and further charges the issue. This is not an easy task, especially in fighting an enemy who uses guerilla warfare tactics. It is hard for a military to determine combatants, as they can easily blend into the civilian population. Concordantly, the military in the Kashmir region will have to use restraint and be well versed in the tenets of counter-insurgency.

Something that India should not take lightly is the US involvement in the region. India should make a concerned effort to ensure that the support the US gives to the Pakistani government is closely monitored and remains focused on the Afghanistan conflict. There is a great potential for the resources that the US is giving to Pakistan to be wielded against India especially after the US withdraws its presence in the region. India should also highlight the overlapping interests that the US and India have over the fight on terrorism in this discussion, and continue to pledge their vested interest in the fight. India stands to be a powerful ally to the US and owing to its regional location can supply valuable intelligence to the US, especially after America scales down its operations, helping to ensure extremists do not attempt to regain strength in Afghanistan. In doing this India can draw favor to its causes. Ideally for India, the United States could turn the screws on Islamabad and insist for the funding of militants in the Kashmir province to cease. By cutting this state tie it gives less refuge and momentum behind the militants, which would be a key turning point.

Having stated these possible solutions, there is no silver bullet, or one clear answer to this problem. It is a dynamic issue that is multifaceted and requires a coordinated effort by the government. Furthermore, it will not completely irradiate the problem. Further attempts to attack the state will continue to be a threat, but that threat can be minimized. It will take many years before some radically charged groups lay down their arms, if ever. All that can be done is to take the higher moral ground and attempt to marginalize these groups as much as possible and push them to the fringes of society so that they become disenfranchised from their ideology, resulting in a loss of their support and public audience.  Once India has solidarity from the people it governs and a respect (or at least an understanding) from its regional neighbors, its can then begin to set right its porous border and distance itself from a conflict which has engendered a great deal strife for India.