CHAPTER 3: INDIA-PAKISTAN AND DOMESTIC ISLAM
As two countries born from the same people, India and Pakistan were molded into creation in 1947 under the scheme of creating and partitioning two separate homelands for the inhabitants of the same land—one state for Muslims, one state for Hindus, predominantly. With this arbitrary drawing of these two new homelands came the undoubted complications associated with such a massive creation; along with the thousands who were killed in ethnic fights that erupted with the founding of these polarized states, new domestic so well as international disputes came to a head, one being over the territories of Jammu and Kashmir. Since partition, this conflict has lead to the mobilization of thousands of troops, furthered the will of acquiring of nuclear weaponry for both parties, and has produced an intense stalemate that has proven to be a thorn in the side of each country. India’s government, facing an increased threat from radical Islamist groups that aim to undermine efforts for the establishment of a multi-ethnic society, should do more to actively bring more Muslims into mainstream Indian society rather than allowing them to be pushed aside and marginalized in everyday life. This analysis shall be drawn from a number of news articles that highlight the increasing radicalization of the Muslim middle class, so well as a number of expert views that base their summations on personal experience and scholarly interpretations, and will incorporate the historical and contemporary development of Muslims in Indian society.
The Kashmir Conflict
Contextually, the states of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, at the time of partition, demographically were predominantly Muslim, however, Kashmir chose not to join in the process of acceding to become a part of Pakistan (Basu, 2010, p. 1). The implications of this move are still being felt today and legitimize India’s territorial claim to the area. Once Pakistan launched an offensive to “liberate” the four million Muslims within these territories from a “reckless” Hindu regime, the local authority and a large majority of the people favored a course of action that would lead to accession with India and subsequently undertook the steps to join the country (Varshney, 1991: p. 999). Over 60 years later, this sequence of events still beleaguers the region with many on both sides of the demarked border-crying foul (Varshney, 1991: p. 999). Nowadays, however, the picture is rather different. India has become home to 100 million Muslims, not the mere 40 million who remained to become Indian citizens after partitioning took place (Perry, 2003: p.1); Islam as a whole has become more and more visible in everyday society, much to the chagrin of many Hindus (Luce, 2006: p. 256). With this, India is presented with an interesting dilemma; namely how to deal with a counter insurgency that is Islamic in nature without catalyzing further Hindu nationalism, defend its territory from an ideologically radically different neighbor, so well as combat Muslim extremism without alienating a large sector of the native population.
Pakistan and India’s relations are far more complex than just the result of territorial skirmishes—there is a direct difference in underlying philosophy that is found at the heart of the conflict between these two neighbors. Should a verdict on the Kashmir conflict be reached that awards the entire state to one side or the other, the fundamental identities of each state will be questioned (Luce, 2006: pp. 236-237). The struggles and wars that have been fought are based on deeper principles that draw their legitimacy from age-old battles and historical wrongdoings, and in recent years, have been penetrated by outside forces from other countries or even far away regions of the world, as this area is seen as part of a larger struggle for some. On a micro-scale, India and Pakistan suffer from a regional conflict, however for many, particularly those involved with Islamic terrorism and the prevention thereof, Kashmir is a key piece in a global puzzle (Luce, 2006: p. 233, 242).
India’s Relationship with Islamic Terrorism
Muslim terrorists have long made India a target for their activities. The Mumbai attacks in November of 2008 were one such event that captured the attention of the media, worldwide. Members of radical Islamist terrorist organizations simultaneously opened fire in the crowded central train station, in two landmark hotels, at the domestic airport, as well as at a popular café (Magnier, 2008: p.1-2). The political outcry in the aftermath of these events lead to a series of inquiries by the Indian government that drew links between members of the terrorist organizations responsible and the Pakistani government, its intelligence agency, and military (Associated Press, 2010: p.1). Lashkar-e-Toiba, a group banned in Pakistan and considered a terrorist organization by India and many western governments, claimed responsibility for the attacks. Since this time, the Pakistani government has done little to limit the actions of Lashkar-e-Toiba, which has sought shelter and can grow in a virtually uninhibited manner within confines of the tribally administered regions of Pakistan’s border provinces with Afghanistan (Schmitt, 2008: p.1). While the Pakistani government undoubtedly sees Lashkar-e-Toiba as a liability when it comes to relations with the United States and western allies, the fact of the matter remains that very little has been done to stem the influence of such militant Islamist groups. They remain a threat to the Indian regime, and therefore a practical asset to Pakistan in some ways, as is evidenced by Pakistan’s secret service, the ISI, financing of reconnaissance missions within India for the operatives of the Mumbai attacks (Schmitt, 2008: p.1 ).
Even earlier than 2008, however, Mumbai was seen as a battleground for such terrorist activities. On July 11, 2006, seven bombs were detonated on regional transit trains within eleven minutes of each other at various points throughout the city. Over two hundred people were killed and the Students Islamic Movement of India and, once again, Lashkar-e-Toiba jointly claimed responsibility. The Pakistani government quickly condemned Indian rhetorical gestures that laid any blame on Pakistan and rejected the notion that motivation for these attacks came from outside of India. These initiatives were the product of “homegrown” terrorism and insurgencies, according to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry (CNN News, 2006: p.1). India, however, made its position very clear by halting diplomatic talks with Pakistan that had been going on at the time, and calling on Pakistan to follow through with its previous commitment that claimed the Musharaf regime would take steps to combat cross-border terrorist activities, a commitment that had not been honored to date (Press Trust of India, 2006: p.1).
Islam in Domestic India: Inequalities Analyzed
A curious and somewhat neglected effect of this conflict seen within the Indian domestic scene may pose an equally large threat to Indian society. With comments being made by the Pakistani foreign ministry, saying that India is merely using Pakistan as a scapegoat and denying the fact that it faces its own domestic problem with Islamic militantism, a signal is being sent that perhaps India is indeed suffering increasing threats both from abroad and from within the country due to unjust policies and large scale discrimination against Muslim citizens. Indian society, though represented by one of the oldest democratic governments in the world, is stratified to an extreme. Many Muslims feel that they are increasingly becoming victims to societal stigmas that pitch Hindus into “Us vs. Them” campaigns that portray Muslims as outsiders and foreigners on the subcontinent and within Indian culture. While equality under the law is guaranteed under the constitution, individuals still find that they are discriminated against and wronged due to their beliefs (Perry, 2003: p.1).
India’s legal system ensures that all individuals are equal under the law; however, there are complications that arise within this structure that can make religious equality a sticking point for many within the country (Vepachedu, 1995: p.1). Indian law guarantees the same rights to all citizens and proclaims that any piece of legislation that goes against this granting of “fundamental rights” is negated. “Religious personal laws” do exist, however and these laws establish the precedents that, under certain circumstances, actions are to be punished and ruled upon in accordance with varying religious practices. The commonly accepted Hindu version of these “personal laws” have been revised and modernized in some aspects, to include such changing dynamics in the equal rights of women, however Muslim and other minority personal laws have remained virtually the same throughout the course of time (Vepachedu, 1995: p.1). The Indian government does not want to infringe upon the individual religious freedoms it aspires to ensure and proscribe, and therefore, a suggested uniform personal law that would be applicable to all citizens regardless of their religious affiliation has faced strong opposition from minorities who fear dominance by Hindu nationalists (Vepachedu, 1995: p.1).
Demographics have long shifted from how they looked in 1947; India today looks quite a bit more different than it did at the time of its founding. Muslim growth rates have risen and this population currently makes up approximately 13% of the country’s total (Luce, 2006 p. 246; Perry, 2003: p.1). While these shifts have become more and more evident over time, little has changed within the actual culture and society of India to allow for such an adjustment. Only three percent of government employees are Muslim and literacy rates in urban areas favor Hindus at 81%, while Muslims are found at 70% (Perry, 2003: p.1). Differences in income earned are equally as noticeable. While to some, such statistics can be attributed merely to chance, systematic discrimination against Muslims in the private and governmental sectors is widely practiced (Perry, 2003: p.1). Muslim families who have indeed broken through the barriers they face and become successful, or gone abroad and returned to India with newly earned wealth, are often targets for discrimination by Hindu nationalists and mobs (Perry, 2003: p.1). These groups receive much of their backing and support from higher-caste Hindus, eager to maintain their place in society and defend their class ranking from these newly moneyed and influential groups (Heitzman, 1995: p.1).
Ethnic Violence, Rioting, and the Implications Thereof
Ethnic violence has flared up from time to time when political or religious events serve as catalysts that rehash age-old tensions. Astounding figures show that since the advent of partition and the independence of the Indian state, three quarters of those killed in such clashes were Muslim. Likewise, an equal proportion of all property destroyed and damaged during these bouts of violence belonged to Muslims as well (Perry, 2003: p.1). While it is important to consider the fact that Hindu nationalist movements represent a fringe ideology within the state and not the state as a whole, a number of events present worrisome findings.
The events that lead to the brutal death of one Zaheera Sheikh’s family and close neighbors paint a grim picture that has caused great alarm among both moderate Hindus and Muslims (Perry, 2003: p.1). In 2002, during the religious riots in the state of Gujarat where Zaheera lived, approximately 2,000 Muslims were “mowed down”; men, women, children alike. The state’s authorities pressured many Muslim victims to drop their court cases against accused Hindus despite abundant evidence. Subsequently, Muslim families were offered financial compensations for the loss of life incurred, however, only half the amount that Hindu families were offered in reparations for their losses (Perry, 2003: p.1). Such injustices display a worrying trend that could spread and become toxic for India’s fragile yet vibrant and colorful society. Should more and more Hindus become pulled into this psychology that deems Islam as being innately incompatible within the culture and society of India, ever more Muslims will become disenchanted with the way their fellow countrymen treat them in everyday life. In 1993, when busses in central Mumbai were bombed and the perpetrators identified, authorities were startled to find that these individuals were not poor, marginalized, Islamic fanatics who stemmed from abroad or who had been cast out of society, but rather doctors and computer specialists, with the potential of accessing high-level jobs with many benefits. The discontent had spread from the outside edges of the Muslim population into the very top of the demographic, proving very worrisome for Indian authorities (Perry, 2003: p.1).
A Fight Over Muslims
It is no coincidence that systematic discrimination of those practicing Islam within India has lead to such intense feelings of mistrust and disenchantment. In 2008, a Time News article published on the topic of India’s Muslim population provided an insight on what many feel exemplifies the two different contexts of religion in both India and Pakistan: In Pakistan, religion serves to unite the population, bringing individuals together while in India, religion is pulling the fabric of the apart (Baker, 2008, p. 2). Pakistan’s government understands the importance of this, and has created a national identity based upon the already binding religious one (Luce, 2006: p. 230). India in so far, lacks the institutions and foundations that unite on such strong subjects such fundamentally strong factors as religion (Baker, 2008, p. 2).
Policy Suggestions:
With evidence supplied suggesting that India is, as Pakistani officials have claimed, facing a domestic problem with its growing Muslim population, Indian governmental authorities and Indian society as a whole must make changes to ensure that this situation does not become a reason for further concern. Policy changes should take place that outline how India can combat fundamental Islamism from becoming a national security issue, considering that ongoing conflicts with Pakistan have not lessened. Pakistan may find it ever more appealing to exploit the unrest and dissatisfaction felt by India’s Muslim population in creating political turmoil and civil unrest for its own personal benefit. First and foremost, I personally would create a policy that pushes for the establishment of a uniform personal law that does not base the verdicts of family law upon various religious principles. While this will be an extremely difficult task to undertake, especially with this being a fringe-policy that is mainly supported by the Hindu political-right and not by many minorities, I believe that the means for equality within Indian society are hindered by various religions seeking justice through different channels. Centralization will ensure that all citizens, be they Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, or Christian, are held to the same standards and given the same civil liberties. Even the notion that a Muslim man and a Hindu man can be held accountable via “separate but equal” modes of the law breeds inequality, it seems.
Building off of this, what India needs in order to successfully combat an offensive Pakistan is a united general public that is bound by something stronger than simply citizenship. An Indian identity is most certainly in existence, yet not omnipresent in all corners of public life. The Indian identity still works to exclude, to maintain an ideological “Hindustan,” despite its widespread diversity and multicultural makeup. While this does not necessarily entail granting special rights to minority groups, this should mean that the government and the country’s institutions should indeed grant the equality they lay such great value on—the government’s make up should therefore represent the make up of its people, and perhaps certain measures as they were introduced for the Dalit Caste in order to ensure societal progression, should be established for Muslims as well. Recent political pushes for such programs have been given little support, however, such policies would work to reduce systemic inequality within the bureaucracy, so well as lessen the gap that between Hindus and Muslims that is currently being seen in terms of literacy rates, birth rates, life expectancy, and income (Desphande, 2010, p.1). There is indeed, a reason why Islamic political parties so well as the Muslim population vote in blocks and align themselves with those parties that support the poorest citizens in India (Luce, 2006: p.114).
The ending of such inequalities within the system of representation would give hope that discrepancies in judicial practices between Hindus and Muslims, on a regional level, are no longer maintained. As evidenced by the case of the victims of the 2002 Gujarat riots, where intimidation and corruption heavily influenced the proceedings of those who sought justice, so well as cooperation amongst authorities and rioters, was commonplace, discriminatory practices deeply ingrained within the system must be stamped out in order for the general public to truly believe in a structure based on equality (Vepachedu, 1995: p.1).
With the combating of Islamophobia amongst the general Hindu majority in India, one would see less disenchantment and outright rejection of the Indian system by moderate and well-to-do Muslims, who otherwise feel targeted and “foreign” in a society dominated by Hindus. By the same line of thought, the suggestion that Islam is foreign to India simply because invaders brought the belief to the subcontinent centuries ago, would also apply to the English language, which was similarly brought to the country by conquerors who spread their own culture yet is now seen as being distinctly “Indian.” Islam has its cultural and societal place within the secular government of India, so well as within the culture of the nation, despite Hinduism being the most prevalent belief among the general public. When Islam finds itself at home amidst the other religions and properly accepted as an Indian belief within the country’s culture, discontent among those who fear persecution will become irrelevant and India will see itself become more stable on the domestic side of affairs.
Internationally, such a monument shift will mean that India can fear less a domestic dispute that divides the homeland, and can focus more on those threats that come from abroad. The Pakistani government will be hard placed to lay blame on discontented Muslims who are simply fighting to ensure their freedoms, while the Indian government will be in a better position to call any bluffs made to assert such claims. In essence, a contented domestic Muslim population, living within India would negate the moral argument Pakistan makes, as a liberator of oppressed Muslims. With India’s economy growing at unprecedented rates and leading the way in innovative technologies, with many of the historically poorest castes in India now rising the ranks and financially overtaking their traditional superiors, it would be a disappointment to say that this new Indian growth would come at the loss of Muslims’ involvement in society, especially when Muslims have indeed proven their useful contributions in the political and economic sectors, recently. Growing disenchantment with the ever-popularizing notion that India is for Hindus will become a source of great concern for the government. When interviewed by TIME magazine about the state of the country he lives in and is trying to change, “Umar,” a leader within the Student Islamic Movement of India (the outlawed group claiming partial responsibility for the 2006 Mumbai bus bombing) was quoted as saying, “This country doesn’t work for Muslims any more. You can’t get a proper education. You can’t get a job. You’re not even safe.” It is now only a question of what the government and society must do to make sure that it is not too late to reverse such thinking (Perry, 2003: p.1).
